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Learning Unethical Practices from a Co-worker: 
The Peer Effect of Jose Canseco
*
 
This paper examines the issue of whether workers learn productive skills from their co-
workers, even if those skills are unethical. Specifically, we estimate whether Jose Canseco, 
one of the best baseball players in the last few decades, affected the performance of his 
teammates. In his autobiography, Canseco claims that he improved the productivity of his 
teammates by introducing them to steroids. Using panel data on baseball players, we show 
that a player’s performance increases significantly after they played with Jose Canseco. After 
checking 30 comparable players from the same era, we find that no other baseball player 
produced a similar effect. Clearly, Jose Canseco had an unusual influence on the productivity 
of his peers. These results are consistent with Canseco’s controversial claims, and suggest 
that workers not only learn productive skills from their co-workers, but sometimes those skills 
may derive from unethical practices. These findings may be relevant to many workplaces 
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* We thank Guy Stecklov for helpful comments. 1 Introduction
There is a growing literature that stresses the importance of the environment in determining
the outcomes of individuals. Most of this literature is concerned with examining how peers
and environmental factors a⁄ect youth behavior regarding their educational achievements,
health, criminal involvement, work status, and other economic outcomes.1 This paper
examines the issue of how workers a⁄ect the productivity of other workers. If workers
learn valuable skills and work habits from their co-workers, then ￿peer e⁄ects￿between
workers should exist in many work environments. A peer e⁄ect across workers could also
result from behavioral considerations such as group norms, peer pressure, shame, and guilt.
Recent work suggests that peer e⁄ects between workers are empirically signi￿cant.2
The existing literature, however, has not examined whether workers sometimes learn
unethical practices from their co-workers in order to boost their productivity. A high
payo⁄ to performance naturally creates incentives to adopt any means necessary to boost
productivity. Given that there is heterogeneity in skill, risk aversion, and moral character,
these incentives will sometimes be strong enough for at least some workers to adopt uneth-
ical practices which enhance productivity. Once one worker adopts questionable methods
which seem to be e⁄ective, competitive pressures may lead others to follow suit in order
to get ahead, or perhaps just to stay even with other workers who are adopting similar
techniques.
This mechanism is a plausible explanation for the apparent widespread use of performance-
enhancing drugs in baseball, cycling, and track and ￿eld. Outside the world of sports, this
di⁄usion process could show up through the adoption of dubious accounting methods,
questionable ethics by lawyers, political corruption, noncompliance with public disclosure
laws, cheating by students, biased reporting by the media, cheating in academic research,
or other ways of skirting legal or ethical requirements. The literature on crime has found
that criminal activity does respond to economic conditions (see Gould, Weinberg, and
1See Angrist and Lang (2004), Guryan (2004), Hoxby (2000), Sacerdote (2001), Zimmermann (2003),
Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001), Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003), Oreopoulos (2003), Jacob (2004),
Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow (2004), Gould, Lavy and Paserman (2004a and 2004b).
2See Kandel and Lazear (1992), Ichino and Maggi (2000), Winter (2004), Mas and Moretti (2006), and
Gould and Winter (2007, forthcoming).
1Mustard, 2002). Here, we highlight the idea that in the absence of persistent monitoring
and rigid enforcement of ethical and legal practices, competitive pressures may lead to a
￿rat race￿among workers to learn unethical behavior from co-workers in order to boost
their productivity. As such, this paper makes a contribution to the recent literature that
has demonstrated that agents do respond to incentives to cheat or engage in corruption
(Duggan and Levitt, 2002; Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Wolfers, 2006; and Kuziemko and
Werker, 2006).
To examine the empirical relevance of this issue, we estimate whether Jose Canseco,
one of the best baseball players in the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s, a⁄ected the productivity of his
fellow teammates. Among his many accomplishments, Jose Canseco was the ￿rst player
in professional baseball to join the ￿40-40 Club￿(40 home runs and 40 stolen bases in a
season). Canseco was not only one of the most productive players of his era, he was highly
controversial both on and o⁄ the ￿eld, and remains even more so after his retirement in
2001. During his playing career, he was frequently in the tabloids for incidents such as
being arrested for bringing a loaded weapon onto a university campus, crashing his own
car into his wife￿ s car, and dating Madonna. While he was still playing, rumors circulated
about his use of steroids, but he denied them and even considered suing reporters for libel.3
However, when he retired in 2001, Canseco admitted to using steroids, and claimed that the
phenomenon was so widespread that ￿there would be no baseball left if they drug-tested
everyone today￿(Bryant, 2005).
In 2005, Canseco wrote a highly controversial book, ￿Juiced,￿in which he claims not
only to have taken steroids throughout his playing career, but also that he gave them to his
fellow teammates. The self-proclaimed ￿Godfather of Steroids￿claimed to be a pioneer of
steroid use, and takes credit for igniting a contagion of drug use in professional baseball.4
He speci￿cally named six famous power-hitters that he claims to have personally injected
with steroids, and claimed that his in￿ uence was much wider than that. He writes in his
book (page 134): ￿My expertise on steroids could make other players around me a lot
3￿Once the rumour went out that I was on steroids￿ though no one presented smoking guns￿ I was
persona-non-grata. I wanted to sue Boswell, but in the end, it just didn￿ t seem worth my time.￿(￿Juiced￿ ,
page 117)
4Chapter 19 of ￿Juiced￿is titled ￿The Godfather of Steroids.￿
2better too.￿Other writers have claimed that Canseco was known as the ￿The Chemist￿
(Bryant, 2005 page 189) and the ￿Typhoid Mary of Steroids￿(Fainaru-Wada and Williams,
2006, page xiii). Indeed, taking steroids is not simple. According to Canseco, steroids are
e⁄ective only if they are used correctly in conjunction with human growth hormone, lifting
weights, a proper diet, and abstinence from recreational drugs. He claimed that he obtained
his knowledge from extensive reading, talking to weightlifters, a friend who used them, and
experimenting on himself. He writes (page 135), ￿I was the ￿rst to educate others about
how to use them, the ￿rst to experiment and pass on what I￿ d learned, and the ￿rst to get
contacts on where to get them. I taught which steroid has which e⁄ect on the body, and
how to mix or ￿stack￿certain steroids to get a desired e⁄ect.￿
Canseco claimed that he shared his knowledge not only with other players, but
also with trainers who would transmit the knowledge throughout the league. He writes
(page 211) that: ￿As soon as the trainers I talked to started getting involved, the steroid
￿ oodgates burst. The players started doing them right there in the locker room, so openly
that absolutely everybody knew what was happening. It was so open, the trainers would
jokingly call the steroid injections B12 shots and soon the players had picked up on that
little code name, too.￿ Two years after Canseco￿ s book, the Mitchell Report (2007) also
made accusations of widespread use of steroids and human growth hormone in professional
baseball. The two main sources of information for the report came from two trainers (Kirk
Radomski and Brian McNamee) who provided evidence that they supplied 53 players with
steroids and human growth hormone. McNamee is directly linked to Canseco, since they
both worked for the Toronto Blue Jays in 1998, and McNamee admits in the report that
he consulted with Canseco on the use of steroids and considered him a knowledgeable
expert.5 McNamee later went on to inject many other players during his tenure with the
New York Yankees, and thus, Canseco has a direct link to the contagion outlined in the
Mitchell Report.
5The Mitchell Reports (2007) states on pages 169-170: ￿During the 1998 season (around the time of
the injections), Clemens showed McNamee a white bottle of Anadrol-50. Clemens told McNamee he was
not using it but wanted to know more about it. McNamee told Clemens not to use it. McNamee said he
took the bottle and gave it to Canseco.￿ In footnote 387 on page 170, it states: ￿McNamee stated that he
showed the bottle to Canseco because he thought that Canseco was knowledgeable and he felt comfortable
approaching him. According to McNamee, Canseco volunteered to take the bottle.￿
3Interestingly, the most notorious accusation in the Mitchell Report is also linked to
Canseco. In the report, McNamee claims that he supplied steroids to Roger Clemens, who
is widely considered one of the greatest pitchers of all time.6 Clemens and Canseco were
teammates in 1998 in Toronto, and McNamee testi￿es that Clemens asked McNamee for
help with steroids for the ￿rst time shortly after he witnessed Clemens having a meeting
with Canseco.7 Canseco admits that he never saw Clemens take steroids, but he told the
Mitchell Commission that he practically encouraged Clemens to use steroids by explaining
on numerous occasions ￿the bene￿ts of Deca-Durabolin and Winstrol and how to ￿ cycle￿
and ￿ stack￿steroids.￿ 8 In his book, Canseco also talks about conversations with Clemens
about the need for pitchers like him to take steroids in response to the widespread use of
batters who were gaining the upper hand.9
However, considering Canseco￿ s tarnished reputation and his penchant for doing just
about anything for money, no one really knows whether his claims are true or whether they
were part of a publicity stunt to help promote his book. His claims have been disputed, and
even the Mitchell Report (2007) did not give much credence to his testimony, despite the
fact that Canseco was one of the only current or former players who agreed to cooperate
with the investigation.10 Although many suspect that at least some of his claims are true,
6In response to the Mitchell Report, Clemens denies all accusations of using steroids and human growth
hormone, but admits to taking shots of B12. However, two years prior to the Mitchell Report (2007),
Canseco not only claimed that the term ￿B12 shot￿ was a nickname for steroids, but he speci￿cally
mentioned that Clemens used that term as a euphemism for steroids in their conversations. Canseco
writes on page 211: ￿I￿ ve never seen Roger Clemens do steroids, and he never told me that he did. But
we￿ ve talked about what steroids could do for you, in which combinations, and I￿ ve heard him use the
phrase B12 shot with respect to others.￿
7The Mitchell Report states on page 168: ￿McNamee attended a lunch party that Canseco hosted at his
home in Miami. McNamee stated that, during this luncheon, he observed Clemens, Canseco, and another
person he did not know meeting inside Canseco￿ s house, although McNamee did not personally attend
that meeting. . . . Toward the end of the road trip which included the Marlins series, or shortly after
the Blue Jays returned home to Toronto, Clemens approached McNamee and, for the ￿rst time, brought
up the subject of using steroids. Clemens said that he was not able to inject himself, and he asked for
McNamee￿ s help.￿
8Mitchell Report (2007), page 168.
9Canseco writes on page 211: "A lot of pitchers did steroids to keep up with hitters. If everyone else
was getting stronger and faster, then you wanted to get stronger and faster, too. If you were a pitcher,
and the hitters were all getting stronger, that made your job that much more di¢ cult. Roger (Clemens)
used to talk about that a lot. ￿ You hitters are so darn strong from steroids,￿he￿ d say. ￿ Yeah, but you
pitchers are taking it too. You￿ re just taking di⁄erent types,￿I￿ d respond.￿
10Three of the seven players that Canseco claimed in his book that he personally injected with steroids
were not even mentioned in the report (Ivan Rodriguez, Wilson Alvarez, and Dave Martinez). Three
of the other players were cited by the report, but not for evidence provided by Canseco. Canseco also
4the same people often suspect that many are exaggerated. For example, Bryant (2005,
page 373) writes of Jose Canseco and his book: He is the mysterious, frustrating character
he was as a player: gifted, intelligent, and provocative, yet given to exaggeration, spite,
and contradiction. In making his points, he violates the tenet of clubhouse secrecy that
for years maintained the steroid era. He violates the trust of the players with whom he
won and lost games, with whom he caroused, drank, and laughed. Canseco returns years
of ridicule with a withering indictment of the sport.
This paper analyzes whether there is any empirical evidence to support the notion
that Jose Canseco a⁄ected the performance of his teammates by turning them on to steroid
use. The hypothesis is tested using panel data on the performance of baseball players from
1970 to 2003. After controlling for the individual ￿xed-e⁄ect of each player and a rich set
of other control variables (experience, year e⁄ects, home ballpark characteristics, division
e⁄ects, and managerial quality), the empirical analysis shows that a player￿ s performance
signi￿cantly increases after playing on the same team with Jose Canseco. This result is
especially true for measures of performance like power hitting which are typically a⁄ected
by physical strength. However, the results are signi￿cant for simple batting performance
as well, where baseball folklore maintains that physical strength is not a dominant factor.
The results are smaller, but still signi￿cant, if the sample excludes the six players
that Jose Canseco claims to have personally injected with steroids. This pattern is con-
sistent with the idea that these players did indeed bene￿t from Canseco￿ s human capital
in chemistry, but they also might indicate that Canseco ￿cherry-picked￿six of the most
productive players that he played with, even if they are completely innocent, just for the
promotional value of creating a larger scandal. Therefore, our ￿ndings that the results are
signi￿cant for both the entire sample (which Canseco could not possibly ￿cherry pick￿for
his book) and the sample without the six players present strong evidence that Canseco
had a ￿positive￿in￿ uence on the productivity of his teammates. We then check to see if
30 other comparable players from the same era generated similar positive e⁄ects on their
teammates. This analysis reveals no evidence of similar e⁄ects from any other player
named other players that he did not personally inject as users, and these players were not mentioned in
the report either (Bret Boone, Tony Saunders, and Brady Anderson).
5￿thus indicating that Jose Canseco had an unusual in￿ uence on the productivity of his
teammates.
It is important to note that the results are not driven by a common shock to all
players on the same team, which is always a potential problem in the identi￿cation of peer
e⁄ects. There are several reasons for this. First, Canseco played on ten di⁄erent teams
throughout his career. In fact, the seven players that Canseco claimed to have injected
played on three di⁄erent teams with him.11 Second, the positive e⁄ect of Canseco on his
peers shows up after they no longer play with him, and therefore, are playing for various
teams in the league. So, the results could not come from a common shock to all players on
one team. Third, as stated above, we found no evidence of peer e⁄ects for six power-hitters
who played with Canseco and shared the same coaches and team characteristics, which
refutes the idea that the e⁄ect is coming from the team rather than Canseco himself.
A word of caution is appropriate regarding the interpretation of our ￿ndings. Al-
though the results are consistent with Canseco￿ s claims that he improved his teammates
by introducing them to steroids, the results cannot identify exactly why his teammates
seemed to have bene￿ted from playing with him. It is possible that they bene￿tted from
his workout habits, batting technique, work ethic, etc. However, in the very least, the
evidence provides considerable back-up to his bravado: ￿I don￿ t think there￿ s any question
that when I arrived in Texas the other Rangers saw me as a useful resource￿(￿Juiced,￿
page 134). Given the multi-million dollar incentives inherent in professional baseball, we
now show you why his teammates felt that way.
2 The Data and Background
The data was obtained from the ￿Baseball Archive￿which is copyrighted by Sean Lahman,
and is a freely available on the Internet for research purposes. The data contains extensive
personal and yearly performance information on players, coaches, and teams for every
season of professional baseball. The sample is restricted to the seasons between 1970 and
11McGwire played with Canseco on the Oakland A￿ s in the late 1980￿ s; Palmeiro, Gonzalez, and Ro-
driguez played with Canseco on the Texas Rangers in the early 1990￿ s; Giambi played with Canseco on
the Oakland A￿ s in 1997; and Alvarez and Martinez played with Canseco on the Tampa Bay Devil Rays
in the late 1990￿ s.
62003. Pitchers are included in the sample if they pitched at least 10 games in a season,
while non-pitchers are included if they batted at least 50 times in a season. The unit of
observation is the person-year, so all variables are measured at the annual level.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample. The upper portion of the ta-
ble presents the means and standard deviations for standard measures of performance by
non-pitchers: homeruns, strikeouts (which typically are high if you are trying to hit home-
runs), RBI￿ s (runs batted in), batting average (number of hits per time at-bat), slugging
percentage (which is similar to the batting average but takes into consideration the quality
of the hit), intentional walks (which are typically high if you are a dangerous batter), base
on balls (typically high if you are a dangerous batter), steals (typically related to speed,
but Canseco claims that steroids helped him steal by making him faster), errors (in ￿eld-
ing), number of times at-bat, and number of games played. The sample of non-pitchers
is divided into ￿power hitters￿(￿rst base, out￿elders, catchers, and designated hitters)
and ￿position players￿(second base, third base, and short-stop). The former category
emphasizes batting with power (homeruns, slugging percentage, etc.) while the second one
emphasizes ￿elding skills at the expense of hitting prowess. This pattern is exhibited in
Table 1 which shows that power hitters hit 9.55 homeruns per year versus 6.38 for position
players. The slugging percentage is also considerably higher for power hitters.
Table 1 also shows the means for variables which concern the extent to which players
interacted with Canseco throughout his career. The variable ￿ever with Canseco￿ is a
dummy variable for ever playing on the same team with Canseco, while the variable called
￿currently with Canseco￿is a dummy variable for currently being on the same team as
Canseco in a given year. Table 1 indicates the 12 percent of the players in the sample
played with Canseco at some point in their careers, while 2 percent were currently playing
with him in a given year.12
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics for pitchers. The standard
indicator of a pitcher￿ s performance is called the ERA (Earned Run Average).13 A higher
12Only 2 percent of the players played with Canseco in a given year because there are 30 teams in
professional baseball (as of 2000), and Canseco played in only half of the seasons in our sample.
13This measure takes the number of runs that a pitcher allows the opposing team to obtain, and scales
it by the number of innings played, so that it represents the average number of runs which would have
7ERA re￿ ects poorer performance. The average ERA is 4.20, while 13 percent of the pitchers
played at some point with Canseco and 2 percent play concurrently on the same team with
him.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for a list of individual players. The list includes
Jose Canseco, the six power-hitters named by Jose Canseco as players that he personally
injected with steroids (Rafael Palmeiro, Jason Giambi, Mark McGwire, Juan Gonzalez,
Ivan Rodriguez, and Dave Martinez), Ken Caminiti (who admitted that he took steroids
but was not implicated by Canseco and never played with Canseco), and three leading
power-position players from the 1990￿ s that have never been implicated in any scandal and
never played with Jose Canseco (Ken Gri⁄ey Jr., Ryne Sandberg, and Cecil Fielder).14
Like Canseco, most of these other players were voted ￿most valuable player￿at some point
in their career (Canseco in 1988, Sandberg in 1984, Caminiti in 1996, Gonzalez in 1996
and 1998, Gri⁄ey in 1997, Rodriguez in 1999, and Giambi in 2000).
Comparing these players to the overall average, Table 2 reveals a pattern which is
very typical for excellent power hitters: many homeruns, very high slugging percentage, a
little better than average batting average, many RBI￿ s, and many strikeouts (since going for
homeruns often results in strikes). Also, these players have higher than normal intentional
walks and ￿base on balls￿since the opposing teams often ￿pitch around￿dangerous hitters
to prevent them from getting a homerun.
Overall, Table 2 demonstrates that this list of players includes some of the best power
hitters of their generation, although Dave Martinez is perhaps not quite at the same level
as the others. The statistics for Jose Canseco certainly show that he belongs in this elite
group, but he does not stand out among the group as being the absolute best. In the
next section, we examine whether Jose Canseco a⁄ected the performance of his peers, and
then we compare the results for Canseco to those obtained by estimating the peer e⁄ect
been scored o⁄ the pitcher in a full game. The ERA is calculated by: (number of earned runs/innings
pitched)*9. Runs due to defensive errors by other players are not counted, hence the name ￿earned￿run
average.
14In Canseco￿ s book, he also named pitcher Wilson Alvarez, who is not included in the table because
he is not a hitter. Ken Caminiti was the most valuable player in the National League 1996, but later
admitted that he took steroids throughout his career. He ended his 15 year career in 2001 and died in
2004 of a heart attack. In an interview with Sports Illustrated in 2002, Caminiti estimated that half of
the players in baseball are on steroids. (See http://espn.go.com/classic/obit/s/2004/1010/1899091.html)
8of players who had similar careers and played during the same era (the 10 players listed in
Table 2 plus 20 other players who are among the best homerun hitters of all-time).
3 The Empirical Analysis
This section examines how the performance of individual players is a⁄ected by coming
into contact with Jose Canseco. Figure 1 presents a naive analysis by showing the mean
homeruns for three mutually exclusive categories of power hitting players: those that never
played with Canseco, those that were playing concurrently with Canseco, and those that
played with Canseco in the past. Figure 1 shows that players who played with Canseco in
the past have much higher homeruns than those who played with him concurrently, and
both of these groups have much higher homerun production than those that never played
with him. Figure 2 displays a similar pattern regarding the slugging percentage ￿those
that played with him are much better sluggers than those that did not.
This stark pattern could be due to the higher ability levels of players who happened
to play with Canseco in the present and past, or it may be due to the causal e⁄ect of
Canseco on his peers. To control for the non-random allocation of players who might
have played with Canseco over time, all regressions will include individual ￿xed-e⁄ects.
Furthermore, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the e⁄ect of Canseco on his peers may be
di⁄erent between current and former teammates. Therefore, to allow for the possibility
that it may take a period of time for Canseco to a⁄ect the performance of his teammates,
the analysis examines whether there is evidence for an immediate e⁄ect of Canseco on the
output of current teammates and whether there is a lingering e⁄ect of Canseco on former
teammates. The basic regression equation is the following:
performanceit = ￿0 + ￿1(playing with canseco)it + ￿2(after canseco)it
+￿i + ￿3(other controls)it + "it
where the performance of player i in year t is a function of a dummy variable for whether
he plays on the same team as Jose Canseco in year t (playing with canseco), a dummy
variable for having played with Canseco in the past but not during year t (after canseco),
the ￿xed ability of player i represented by ￿i; other observable control variables, and the
9unobserved component which varies over time, "it:15 Separate regressions are run for each
performance measure listed in Table 1. The other control variables include: the batting
average in player i￿ s division (excluding his own team) in year t which controls for the
quality of the pitching and batting in the team￿ s division in the same year, the team
manager￿ s lifetime winning percentage which is an indicator for the quality of the team￿ s
coaching, the ballpark hitting factor which control for whether the team￿ s ballpark is easy
or di¢ cult for batters in year t, the player￿ s years of experience (number seasons played
in the league), year e⁄ects, and dummy variables for each division. It is worth noting
that these control variables have no e⁄ect on our results for the other coe¢ cients. The
unobserved ability of player i; ￿i; is controlled for by including ￿xed-e⁄ects for each player
i.
The main parameters of interest are ￿1 and ￿2, which indicate whether Jose Canseco
a⁄ected the performance of his current or former teammates respectively. We model the
potential e⁄ect of Canseco on his peers as an intercept e⁄ect, since the main factor is
likely to be whether the person takes steroids or not, rather than learning how to inject
steroids over time. Also, the distinction between playing ￿with Canseco￿ and playing
￿after Canseco￿is important since even if a player did learn about steroids from Canseco,
we do not know when he learned about it during his time with Canseco, but we can be
sure that he already acquired the knowledge after playing with Canseco. The inclusion
of a ￿xed-e⁄ect for each player means that we are exploiting variation in performance
levels within the career of each player, rather than exploiting variation in the types of
players that may have played with Canseco over time. In this manner, the empirical
strategy controls for the endogenous personnel decisions of team managers. Therefore,
identi￿cation of the parameters of interest comes from seeing whether variation within a
given player￿ s performance over time deviates from the typical player￿ s experience pro￿le
in a way that is correlated with being a current or former teammate of Jose Canseco.
The basic ￿xed-e⁄ect regressions for power hitters are presented in Table 3. Each
15If a player played with Canseco in non-consecutive years, the variable for ￿playing with Canseco￿is
equal to 1 for every year starting in the ￿rst year that the player played with Canseco until the last year
that he played with Canseco. The variable ￿after Canseco￿is equal to one for every year after the last
year that the player played with Canseco.
10column represents a separate regression using the indicated performance measure as the
dependent variable. Column (1) shows that after controlling for all the other variables, a
given power player has more homeruns on average during years that he plays with Canseco
(the estimate for ￿1 is 1.13 with standard error 0.66). However, homerun production seems
to pick up even more after playing with Canseco (the estimate for ￿2 is 2.91 with standard
error 0.64). The same pattern exists for all of the performance measures: strikeouts,
RBI￿ s, slugging percentage, batting average, intentional walks, and ￿base-on-balls.￿Each
of these performance measures increase in a statistically signi￿cant way after playing with
Jose Canseco, but rarely are they statistically signi￿cant while playing with Canseco. It is
worth noting that an increase in each of these measures is indicative of a higher performing
￿power hitter￿ : more homeruns, more strikeouts, a higher slugging percentage, and more
attempts by the other team to ￿pitch around￿ a dangerous hitter (expressed by more
intentional walks and base-on-balls).
The reason why playing with Canseco has a much smaller e⁄ect than playing ￿after
Canseco￿may be due to the idea, mentioned above, that players who learn about steroids
from Canseco do not take steroids during the whole time they are playing ￿with Canseco,￿
but do use them during the entire time that they are former teammates with him. Alter-
natively, it may take some time for Canseco￿ s positive e⁄ect to be realized, or this pattern
may be due to the fact that players who play with him spend more of their time as former
teammates of Canseco than being current teammates of him. For example, power hitters
who played at least one season with Canseco in our sample spent 17 percent of their seasons
on a team with Canseco and 33 percent of their seasons being former teammates with him.
Also, the smaller e⁄ect of playing with Canseco may be due to the idea that Canseco took
away scarce team resources such as playing time, attention from coaches and trainers, etc.
If this were true, then similar peer e⁄ects should be found for other baseball stars. As we
show later, we do not ￿nd similar e⁄ects for other stars, which casts doubt on the hypoth-
esis that star players ￿crowd out￿the performance of other players. If, however, we do
not di⁄erentiate between current and former players by using one variable which indicates
whether the player either plays currently or in the past with Canseco, the coe¢ cient for
homeruns is 2.05, and is still highly signi￿cant with a standard error of 0.549.
11The coe¢ cients in Table 3 are signi￿cant statistically and also sizeable in magnitude.
The estimated e⁄ect of playing ￿after Canseco￿on homeruns is 2.91, which is 30.5% of the
mean homerun production of power hitters (9.55) displayed in Table 1. After playing with
Jose Canseco, a typical power hitter is also estimated to increase his RBI￿ s by 22 percent
(a coe¢ cient of 9.174 compared to the mean RBI￿ s of 41.78). Apparently, the bene￿ts of
playing with Canseco were quite large.
Table 4 presents additional results for power hitters using alternative measures of
performance. The ￿rst three columns show that Canseco had no discernible e⁄ect on steals,
￿elding percentage, and ￿elding errors. Neither of these outcomes is considered particularly
important for power hitting, nor are they typically thought of as being a⁄ected by physical
strength. So, the lack of any e⁄ect for these outcomes strengthens the interpretation of
the results in Table 3 that Canseco had a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on the hitting power
of his former teammates by a⁄ecting their physical strength.
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 4 show that power hitters signi￿cantly increase their
playing time (number of times at-bat and number of games played in a season) after playing
with Canseco.16 Contrary to the outcomes in the ￿rst three columns, playing time should
increase for a power hitter if his hitting prowess has improved.17 The e⁄ect of Canseco
on playing time could be a reason why we see several power hitting performance measures
increase in Table 3 after playing with Canseco. For example, a power hitter will naturally
tend to hit more homeruns and RBI￿ s if they have more chances at bat. The ￿nal column
of Table 4 re-runs the regression for homeruns but controls for number of at-bats. In
comparison to the results in Table 3 which did not control for the number of at-bats,
the results are much smaller but still statistically signi￿cant. That is, a players homerun
production increases after playing with Canseco even if we condition on the number of
chances at bat. Also, it should be noted that two of the outcomes in Table 3 (slugging
16Since playing time is clearly an endogenous outcome which seems to be a⁄ected by Canseco, our
preferred speci￿cation does not include playing time as a control variable. However, as discussed later,
the strong positive e⁄ect of Canseco on his peers operates not only through increased playing time, but
also on measures of performance that are normalized by playing time (slugging percentage and batting
average).
17Also, Canseco claimed that steroids help players recover from injuries faster, which could also increase
playing time. In his personal case, he claimed that steroids extended his career by enabling him to play
with serious back problems.
12percentage and batting average) are already normalized by the number of at-bats, so the
signi￿cant results for these measures indicate that the positive e⁄ect of Canseco on his
teammates is not operating just through an increase in playing time.
We now turn our attention to see if Canseco had an e⁄ect on other types of players
(not power hitters). The upper panel of Table 5 runs similar regressions for a sample of
skilled position players (not pitchers or power hitters) and pitchers. The results indicate
that skilled position players did not increase their homerun production after playing with
Canseco, but they did signi￿cantly increase their batting average and slugging percentage.
Canseco had no discernible e⁄ect on ￿elding percentage and steals. These results suggest
that Canseco had no e⁄ect on measures which clearly should not be a⁄ected by steroids
(￿elding percentage and perhaps steals), but did have an e⁄ect on measures that are im-
portant for these types of players (batting average and slugging percentage). If Canseco
did a⁄ect the physical strength of his former teammates, it is more likely to show up in
the slugging percentage for these types of players than the number of homeruns, since they
typically hit disproportionately more doubles and triples (which a⁄ect the slugging per-
centage) than homeruns. The last column of Table 5 indicates that Canseco had no e⁄ect
on the performance of pitchers, measured by the pitcher￿ s ERA. The lack of signi￿cant
results for pitchers is again consistent with the idea that Canseco only had an e⁄ect by
in￿ uencing the physical strength of his teammates ￿which is unlikely to a⁄ect a pitcher￿ s
performance since pitching has very little to do with physical strength.
Given that Canseco named six speci￿c batters which he claimed to have personally
injected with steroids, it is natural to ask whether the results so far are coming from these
speci￿c players. Table 6 compares the results for power hitters using the full sample (Ta-
ble 3) to the results obtained from a sample which deletes the six named players (Rafael
Palmeiro, Jason Giambi, Mark McGwire, Juan Gonzalez, Ivan Rodriguez and Dave Mar-
tinez). Across all performance measures which are indicative of power hitting performance,
the results are much weaker (roughly half the size) after we delete these players from the
sample, but they are still statistically signi￿cant. This pattern indicates that these six
players are responsible for a sizable portion of the results, but there is still a signi￿cant
e⁄ect of playing with Canseco even for other players ￿something we already saw in Table
135 which showed a signi￿cant Canseco e⁄ect for non-power hitters.
The fact that the results are much smaller when we delete these players from the
sample could indicate that Canseco had the biggest e⁄ect on the players that he speci￿cally
named. However, it is also true that Canseco had a good motive to name these speci￿c
players even if they were completely innocent. For example, Canseco may have named
these speci￿c players because they are high pro￿le athletes and accusing them would help
promote his book much more than accusing an unknown player of steroid use. Also, Canseco
may have tried to take credit for their success, or tarnish their success in comparison to his
diminished reputation. Even if Canseco deliberately lied about his e⁄ect on other players,
he had to know that his claims would be more believable and would help sell more books
by choosing the most obvious high pro￿le cases of players who clearly went on to have an
outstanding career after playing with him. In other words, Canseco may have overstated
his expertise in chemistry, but demonstrated an intuitive sense of basic statistics by naming
the cases with the strongest correlation between individual performance and playing with
him on the same team. For this reason, our preferred speci￿cation is the one which includes
the whole sample, since the e⁄ect of playing with Canseco (and after Canseco) is identi￿ed
from a clearly exogenous variable which Canseco had no chance of a⁄ecting during the
course of writing of his book. For the same reasons, we did not check Canseco￿ s other
claims in his book about steroid use by players that did not play with him ￿since he could
easily ￿cherry-pick￿attention-grabbing names to accuse of steroid use. However, the fact
that the results are still signi￿cant for players other than the six named in the book is
consistent with his claims that his expertise was valuable beyond those six players.
4 The Peer E⁄ect of Similar Players
Having established that Canseco had a positive e⁄ect on power hitters and even non-power
hitters, we now examine whether other baseball stars of the same era generated similar
e⁄ects on their teammates. To allow for the possibility that other players may also generate
a positive e⁄ect by transmitting knowledge about steroids, we estimate the peer e⁄ect of
those that were named by Jose Canseco in his book. In addition, we estimate the peer
14e⁄ect for Ken Caminiti who acknowledged that he took steroids during the height of his
career. For the sake of a simple comparison, we also present results for three famous players
who have never been mentioned as being involved in steroid use: Ken Gri⁄ey Jr., Ryne
Sandberg, and Cecil Fielder. As shown in Table 2, all of the players are similar in the sense
of having outstanding careers. Later, we will systematically choose 26 players who had
similar careers as Jose Canseco, and compare the results for Canseco to those obtained for
all 26 players.
Table 7 presents the results using the same regression speci￿cation used to estimate
the peer e⁄ect of Jose Canseco, but using one of the ten other players instead of Jose
Canseco as the independent variable. One striking pattern that emerges is that many of
the coe¢ cients are negative, in contrast to the results for Canseco which are uniformly
positive on every outcome. The second striking pattern is that very few coe¢ cients are
signi￿cant, again in contrast to Canseco where every coe¢ cient is signi￿cant. In fact, four
of the ten players do not have one signi￿cant coe¢ cient for any of the seven outcomes
(Giambi, McGwire, Gonzalez, and Ryne Sandberg). Two players have one signi￿cant
coe¢ cient (Fielder and Martinez), two players have signi￿cant coe¢ cients for two of the
nine outcomes (Rodriguez and Caminiti), and two players (Palmeiro and Gri⁄ey Jr.) have
three signi￿cant coe¢ cients. However, even for these players, most of the outcomes are not
signi￿cant, and in contrast to Canseco, the signi￿cant coe¢ cients for Palmeiro, Caminiti,
Martinez, and Gri⁄ey Jr. are negative in sign. Rodriguez has two positive coe¢ cients for
strikeouts and at-bats, but no positive coe¢ cients for the main indicators of power hitting
(homeruns and slugging percentage).
Overall, it is clear that the results for Jose Canseco are very unusual in comparison
to players who had similar careers and even players who are suspected to use steroids
(Caminiti and Giambi admitted to steroid use, and Palmeiro tested positive in 2005).
Furthermore, this analysis shows that the statistically signi￿cant results for Canseco are
not simply a product of a large sample size, since the same sample was used to analyze
the peer e⁄ect of the other ten players.
We perform a similar analysis for non-power hitters and pitchers in the bottom
panel of Table 5. In contrast to the upper panel of Table 5 which showed a positive
15e⁄ect of Canseco on the slugging percentage and batting average, only two of the ten other
baseball stars (Palmeiro and Sandberg) had an e⁄ect on these measures of performance.
The other players exhibit no signi￿cant e⁄ects for any measure of performance, so once
again, Jose Canseco seems to be in the minority in terms of his e⁄ect on peers. In the
last column of Table 5, the results show that no player, including Canseco, a⁄ected the
pitching performance of their former teammates. This is the ￿rst case where Canseco seems
to be similar to his other baseball stars. However, this similarity is consistent with the idea
that even if Canseco did a⁄ect the physical strength of his teammates, this should have
no impact on his fellow pitchers since pitching is not related to physical strength. So, if
physical strength is the mechanism through which Canseco a⁄ected his peers in general,
we would expect no e⁄ect for pitchers, which is what we ￿nd in Table 5.
To check the robustness of the results, we now systematically choose a sample power-
hitting players who were comparable to Jose Canseco. Canseco made his professional debut
in 1985, so we restrict our sample to players that started their career between 1981 and
1989. Next, we take only those players who are either on the top 100 list of career home-
runs or those that were homerun hitting champions for any given year between 1985 and
2001 (for either league). Players on the all-time list obviously had great careers, while
those that were hitting champions in a given year had at least one spectacular season.
Jose Canseco matches both of those criteria, as do several other players on the ￿nal list.
Table 8 shows the ￿nal list of 27 players and indicates which criteria they matched to
be included in the sample. The sample includes 7 players that we already examined
(Canseco, Gri⁄ey Jr., Fielder, Sandberg, McGwire, Palmeiro, and Gonzalez) and 20 new
players. The estimated peer e⁄ect of each one of these players is presented in Table 9, which
shows the estimated e⁄ect of each player on ￿ve di⁄erent performance measures for power
hitters (homeruns, strikeouts, intentional walks, RBI￿ s, and slugging percentage) and two
performance measures for position players (batting average and slugging percentage).
Table 9 shows once again how strikingly di⁄erent Jose Canseco is from the rest of
this elite group of players. The estimated e⁄ect for Canseco is positive and signi￿cant
for each of the 7 outcomes. For the other 26 players, 77 percent of the coe¢ cients are not
signi￿cant even at the 10 percent level (140 out of 182 coe¢ cients). Also, unlike Canseco,
16most of the coe¢ cients that are signi￿cant are negative ￿ 26 are negative and 16 are
positive. That is, only 8.8 percent of the coe¢ cients are positive and signi￿cant at the 10
percent level. Furthermore, the coe¢ cients that are positive and signi￿cant are scattered
among many players, which means that the other outcomes for these players are either not
signi￿cant or negative. In other words, there is no other player that has a systematically
large and signi￿cant positive e⁄ect across the seven outcomes. The only player that has
a positive e⁄ect on more than two outcomes is Chili Davis, who has two coe¢ cients that
are signi￿cant only at the 10 percent level and two others at the 5 percent level. Unlike
Canseco, Davis has no e⁄ect on the other three outcomes. Also, in comparison to Canseco,
the coe¢ cients for Davis are much smaller in magnitude and none are signi￿cant at the 1
percent level (5 out of 7 for Canseco are signi￿cant at the 1 percent level).
Overall, Table 9 shows that Canseco is highly unusual in comparison to all the elite
homerun hitters of his generation. Hardly any other player displays any e⁄ect on his
peers, while Canseco has a strong positive e⁄ect on every outcome. A few players do reveal
a systematic pattern, but the pattern indicates a negative e⁄ect on other players. This
seems to be the case for Gri⁄ey, Bonds, Sosa, Belle, and to a lesser extent, Gaetti and
Palmeiro. These players are considered among the best within the 27 players listed in Table
9, so once again, the completely opposite pattern for Canseco accentuates how truly unique
he was.
It is important to note that our ￿ndings refute the idea that a common shock to
all players in the same environment is responsible for the estimated peer e⁄ect of Jose
Canseco. In general, the identi￿cation of a peer e⁄ect is di¢ cult to disentangle from
common shocks or unobserved characteristics shared by a group of people. However,
there are several indications that this is not driving our results. First, Canseco played on
ten di⁄erent teams throughout his career, and the evidence is consistent with his claims
to have injected steroids into the six named players during his tenure with at least three
teams. Second, the positive e⁄ect of Canseco on his peers shows up after they no longer
play with him, and therefore, play for various teams across the league. A common,
sustained shock across various teams which a⁄ects only former teammates of Jose Canseco
is highly unlikely. Third, although team managers may have surrounded Canseco with
17certain types of players, it remains a mystery why a team would do this only for Canseco
and not the other 30 comparable power-hitters that we checked, and it is not likely that a
manager would have the incentive or foresight to build a team around players that would
signi￿cantly improve their performance after they no longer play with Jose Canseco. In
addition, the analysis includes a ￿xed-e⁄ect for each player, which means that changes
in the composition of players should not drive any of our results, since we are exploiting
variation over time ￿within￿the career of each player rather than variation across players.
Finally, we found no evidence of similar peer e⁄ects for six power-hitters who played with
Canseco and shared the same coaches and team characteristics. Taken as a whole, these
￿ndings present strong evidence that the e⁄ect is coming from Canseco and not the shared
characteristics of the team or the endogenous decisions of team managers.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that Jose Canseco had a signi￿cant e⁄ect on his former team-
mates. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd that Canseco had a positive impact on outcomes such as slug-
ging percentage, homeruns, strikeouts, intentional walks, base-on-balls, playing time, and
other performance measures. The pattern of results are all indicative of increased power
hitting performance. In contrast, we ￿nd no e⁄ect of Canseco on his teammates￿pitch-
ing output. In this manner, the results are consistent with Jose Canseco￿ s claims that he
helped his teammates increase their physical strength by introducing them to steroids, since
physical strength is considered an important factor in hitting power but not particularly
useful for pitching.
We have no direct evidence, however, that Jose Canseco￿ s teammates learned about
steroids directly or indirectly from him. We do know that the evidence strongly sup-
ports his claims that he improved the physical strength of his teammates, but we have
no proof that the mechanism responsible for this e⁄ect was steroids. It is possible that
his teammates learned about strength conditioning or other work habits. However, this
paper provides the ￿rst systematic study which shows that the evidence is consistent with
Canseco￿ s scandalous accusations. In particular, our ￿ndings support his claims that he
18started a contagion of steroid use in the late 1980￿ s by teaching his peers and trainers
about the bene￿ts and technology of performance enhancing drugs. The recent Mitchell
Report (2007) provides additional controversial evidence on the widespread use of steroids
in baseball, but almost all of the evidence concerned current players or drug use in the last
￿ve to ten years. The Mitchell Report (2007) is silent on how the epidemic was ignited in
the late 1980￿ s and early 1990￿ s, and does not o⁄er any indication of whether steroids are
e⁄ective or not. In fact, the report cites evidence (page 9) which indicates that the use of
human growth hormone is not e⁄ective at all. Our ￿ndings are consistent with Canseco￿ s
claims that steroids and human growth hormone are highly e⁄ective, and that he was at
the forefront of transmitting the technology of how to use them throughout professional
baseball in the late 1980￿ s and early 1990￿ s.
Even though we do not provide direct evidence of steroid use, the evidence is not
consistent with other explanations. This is best illustrated by our ￿ndings that no other
player seems to have a⁄ected his teammates in the way that Jose Canseco did. After
checking to see whether 30 other power-hitting stars a⁄ected their teammates, we ￿nd
that none of them exhibited anything close to what we see with Jose Canseco. Across
all outcomes that are indicative of being a good power hitter, Jose Canseco had a strong
and signi￿cant impact on each one. For the 30 other players, hardly any of the e⁄ects
were signi￿cant, and most of the coe¢ cients that were signi￿cant were in the opposite
direction (decreasing the performance of their peers). Clearly, Jose Canseco had a very
unusual e⁄ect in comparison to players who had similar careers and even players who are
suspected of using steroids. That is, Canseco is not just generally di⁄erent from everyone
else, but he appears to be unique even among known steroid users (Caminiti, Giambi,
and Palmeiro). Therefore, if the source of the e⁄ect that Canseco apparently had on his
teammates￿batting power was due to something other than steroids (work ethic, batting
techniques, weight training regimen, etc.), why do we not see similar positive e⁄ects from
other elite players on their peers as well? Why would this mechanism be limited to playing
with Jose Canseco?
In his book, Canseco named six speci￿c teammates as players that he personally
injected with steroids. When these names are deleted from the sample, the e⁄ect of
19Canseco on his other teammates was diminished by roughly 50 percent for all outcomes,
but the coe¢ cients were still signi￿cant. This ￿nding supports Canseco￿ s claims that his
in￿ uence was much wider than the six people that he mentioned.
All of this evidence points to the powerful e⁄ect one worker can have on many other
co-workers. This particular case demonstrates how a ￿peer e⁄ect￿ could be generated
by one worker increasing the productivity of other workers, rather than working through
behavioral channels such as peer pressure, shame, guilt, etc. Furthermore, this is a case
where the mechanism may involve unethical means. As the literature on crime suggests,
unethical behavior by one person can cause others to follow suit.18 In the context of the
workplace, once one worker starts doing it, he may obtain a competitive advantage which
can only be neutralized by other workers doing the same.
Ken Caminiti estimated that half the players in baseball use steroids (Verducci,
2002). Perhaps prone to exaggeration, Canseco claimed that 85 percent of major league
baseball players did steroids. In his autobiography, baseball pitcher David Wells (2003)
writes that ￿as of right now, I￿ d estimate 25 to 40 percent of all major leaguers are juiced.
But that number￿ s fast rising.￿He goes on to explain why: ￿Down in the minors, where
virtually every ￿ at-broke, baloney-sandwich-eating Double-A prospect is chasing after the
same, elusive, multimillion-dollar payday, the use of anabolic homer-helpers is ￿ at-out
booming . . . At just about 12 bucks per shot, those steroid vials must be seen as a really
solid investment.￿
Canseco seems to implicitly agree with Wells ￿ he never apologizes about using
steroids or about giving them to others. To him, steroids are simply a way to boost your
competitive advantage. A similar attitude could explain the widespread use of performance-
enhancing drugs in other sports like cycling and track and ￿eld. Outside the world of
sports, similar forces may be at work in terms of accounting practices, unprofessional
behavior by lawyers, political corruption, public disclosures, cheating by students, accuracy
in journalism, reporting in academic research, etc. In general, the knowledge that other
workers or ￿rms are cheating could trigger others to do the same. In some cases, they will
need to learn the unethical skill from a co-worker, but in some cases they may be able to
18See Glaeser et. al. (1996)
20￿gure it out on their own or search for other sources. Overall, this paper highlights the
idea that in the absence of a rigid and persistent enforcement mechanism over unethical
behavior, market forces could lead to a ￿rat race￿where workers are willing to do just
about anything to remain competitive.
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9.55   (9.72)    6.38   (7.81) 
Strikeouts 
 
51.76   (33.34)    47.85   (30.19) 
RBI 
 
41.78   (30.97)    36.25   (26.43) 
Slugging Percent 
 
0.397   (0.086)    0.359   (0.078) 
Batting Average (BA) 
 
0.258   (0.040)    0.252    (0.038) 
Intentional Walks 
 
3.31   (4.23)    2.41   (3.30) 
Base On Balls 
 
32.40   (24.85)    30.61   (22.85) 
Steals 
 
6.46   (10.89)    7.14   (10.15) 
Fielding Percent 
 
0.98   (0.02)    0.97    (0.02) 
Errors 
 
4.30   (3.65)    11.54   (7.40) 
At-Bats 
 
310.41   (175.36)    332.96   (181.60) 
Games 
 
99.02   (40.57)    103.21   (41.46) 
Ever with Canseco 
 
0.12   (0.32)    0.12   (0.33) 
Currently with Canseco 
 
0.02   (0.14)    0.02   (0.14) 
Division Batting Ave.  
 
0.266   (0.007)    0.266   (0.007) 
Manager Winning Pct. 
 
0.50   (0.04)    0.50   (0.04) 
Ballpark Hitting Factor  100.22   (4.92)    100.21   (5.03) 
          
Observations 9534    4826 
        
   Pitchers   
   Mean    Standard 
Deviation 
 
Earned Run Average 
 
 4.20    (1.44)   
Ever with Canseco 
 
 0.13    (0.33)   
Currently with Canseco    0.02    (0.15)   
          
Observations   11367   Table 2: Mean Performance Measures for Nine Baseball Stars  

















































































24.54 0.251 0.472 77.54  101.23 5.85  53.31 

















32.40 Table 3: The Effect of Canseco on Hitting Statistics for Power Position Players 



























































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies 
 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations = 9062             
Players = 1499             
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Each column represents a separate regression, with the dependent 
variable indicated at the top of the table. The sample is composed of "power position" players which 
include players in the following positions: catcher, first base, designated hitter, and the outfield. The 
sample includes data from the 1970 to 2003 seasons.  Jose Canseco has been deleted from the sample.  
Tenure and year dummies are included for every three year interval. 
 Table 4: The Effect of Canseco on other Performance Statistics for Power Players 




























































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes 
Observations = 9062             
Players = 1499             
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Each column represents a separate regression, with the dependent 
variable indicated at the top of the table. The sample is composed of "power position" players which 
include players in the following positions: catcher, first base, designated hitter, and the outfield. The 
sample includes data from the 1970 to 2003 seasons.  Jose Canseco has been deleted from the sample.  
Tenure and year dummies are included for every three year interval. 
 Table 5: The Effect of Canseco on the Performance Statistics for other Players 
  




of Pitchers  
 

















































































































































































































Standard errors are in parentheses.  Each column in the upper panel of the table represents a separate regression, with the 
dependent variable indicated at the top of the table. Skilled position players include the following positions: second base, third 
base, and shortstop. The sample is from the 1970 to 2003 seasons.  The number of skilled position players is 4547 which includes 
panel data on 796 players. The sample of pitchers includes 10561 observations and 1862 players. Jose Canseco has been deleted 
from the sample.  Tenure and year dummies are included for every three year interval. In the lower panel of the table, each 
coefficient came from a separate regression which is specified similarly to the ones in the top panel but use the indicated player 





















































































































              
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Power positions include catcher, first base, designated hitter, and 
the outfield. The sample includes data from the 1970 to 2003 seasons.  Jose Canseco has been deleted 
from the sample.  Tenure and year dummies are included for every three year interval.  In the upper 
panel of the table, each column represents a different regression which is specified in Table 3 (the other 
coefficients have been suppressed).  The lower panel includes similar regressions but after deleting the 
five named players from the sample. 
 
 















































































































































































































Standard errors are in parentheses.  Each coefficient came from a separate regression which is specified 
similarly to the ones in Table 3 but use the indicated player instead of Jose Canseco as the independent 
variable.  The displayed coefficient from each regression is for the variable "after playing with" the 
indicated player.   
 Table 8: The Best Homerun Hitters of Canseco's Era 














Years Led League in 
Homeruns (1985-2001) 
 
Jose Canseco  1985 
 
X   AL88,AL91 
Rafael Palmeiro  1986 X     
Mark McGwire  1986 X   AL87,AL96,NL98,NL99 
Juan Gonzalez  1989 X    AL92,AL93 
Ken Griffey Jr.  1989 X   AL94,AL97,AL98,AL99 
Barry Bonds  1986 X    NL93,NL01 
Sammy Sosa  1989 X    NL00 
Fred McGriff  1986 X    AL89,NL92 
Gary Sheffield  1988 X     
Cal Ripken Jr  1981 X     
Andres Galarraga  1985 X    NL96 
Joe Carter  1983 X     
Cecil Fielder  1985   X  AL90,  AL91 
Larry Walker  1989   X  NL97 
Albert Belle  1989   X  AL95 
Matt Williams  1987   X  NL94 
Gary Gaetti  1981   X   
Greg Vaughn  1989   X   
Ellis Burks  1987   X   
Chili Davis  1981   X   
Darryl Strawberry  1983   X  NL88 
Ron Gant  1987   X   
Ryne Sandberg  1981     NL90 
Jesse Barfield  1981     AL86 
Kevin Mitchell  1984     NL89 
Dante Bichette  1988     NL95 
Howard Johnson  1982     NL91 
The 27 players listed are the full sample of players that entered the league between 1981 and 1989 
and are currently in the top 100 list of players for career homeruns or led one of the two leagues in 
homeruns for at least one year between 1985 and 2001.  
 Table 9: The Effect of the Best Homerun Hitters of Canseco's Era 
  Power Hitters    Position Players 





















Canseco  2.909*** 8.307*** 0.938*** 9.174*** 0.012*   0.014*** 0.015** 
  (0.64) (2.26) (0.33) (2.12) (0.007)    (0.004) (0.008) 
Palmeiro  -1.114 -6.081** -0.592  -5.042* -0.006    0.012** 0.023*** 
  (0.80) (2.82) (0.41) (2.65) (0.008)    (0.005) (0.009) 
McGwire  -0.254 2.809 0.389 -0.216 0.003    -0.002  0.005 
  (0.83) (2.92) (0.42) (2.75) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.010) 
Gonzalez  -0.419 -2.640 -0.322 -1.850 0.001    0.001  0.001 
  (0.80) (2.82) (0.41) (2.65) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.010) 
Griffey Jr.  -3.393*** -7.587**  -1.128** -7.680*** -0.011  0.003  0.007 
  (0.87) (3.06) (0.44) (2.87) (0.009)    (0.007) (0.011) 
Bonds  -2.548***  -9.585*** -0.497 -7.225*** -0.005  0.004  -0.007 
  (0.75) (2.63) (0.37) (2.47) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.010) 
Sosa  -1.674** -8.077***  -0.674  -5.051* -0.006    0.002  0.019* 
  (0.80) (2.84) (0.41) (2.67) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.010) 
McGriff  -0.298 4.010 -0.186 2.586  -0.011   -0.011*  -0.014 
  (0.77) (2.70) (0.39) (2.54) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.010) 
Sheffield  0.247 -0.0720  -0.0501  5.058** 0.010    0.007  0.010 
  (0.74) (2.60) (0.38) (2.45) (0.007)    (0.006) (0.010) 
Ripken Jr.  -0.789 -5.089* -0.198  -3.873 -0.010    0.006  0.010 
  (0.81) (2.85) (0.42) (2.68) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.011) 
Galarraga  0.0817 -3.445 -0.0827 0.934 0.005    0.000 -0.004 
  (0.72) (2.52) (0.37) (2.37) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Carter  0.802 1.952 0.355  5.030** 0.004    0.006  0.011 
  (0.66) (2.33) (0.34) (2.19) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Fielder  -1.079 -4.280 -0.208 0.603 -0.004    -0.003  0.005 
  (0.75) (2.62) (0.38) (2.47) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.011) 
Walker  0.149 -1.166  -1.023**  1.270 0.007    -0.004 -0.006 
  (0.88) (3.10) (0.45) (2.92) (0.009)    (0.007) (0.012) 
Belle  -2.114*** -5.422**  -0.774** -6.804*** -0.017**  -0.006  -0.000 
  (0.74) (2.60) (0.38) (2.45) (0.007)    (0.006) (0.011) 
Williams  0.368  -2.028 1.128*** -0.952 0.021***    0.003  0.013 
  (0.69) (2.43) (0.35) (2.29) (0.007)    (0.007) (0.012) 
Gaetti  -1.412** -3.655  0.0585  -7.004*** -0.008   -0.006  -0.014 
  (0.66) (2.30) (0.34) (2.17) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Vaughn  -0.471 0.753  -0.992**  -1.865 -0.001    -0.001  0.003 
  (0.77) (2.71) (0.40) (2.55) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.010) 
Burks  0.462 0.351  0.0860  0.838 0.012*  0.001  -0.005 
  (0.71) (2.50) (0.37) (2.36) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Davis  1.043* 5.254**  0.428  3.881* 0.015**    0.000  -0.000 
  (0.63) (2.20) (0.32) (2.07) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Strawberry  -0.475 -1.388 0.106 -0.853  -0.001   -0.005  -0.017** 
  (0.70) (2.46) (0.36) (2.32) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.008) 
Gant  -1.327* -1.383  0.269  -3.852  -0.006   -0.011**  -0.015* 
  (0.80) (2.80) (0.41) (2.64) (0.008)    (0.005) (0.008) 
Sandberg  1.582** -2.185  0.110  2.064  -0.001  0.011  0.026** 
  (0.78) (2.74) (0.40) (2.58) (0.008)    (0.007) (0.012) 
Barfield  -0.600 -0.606 0.363 -0.0696 -0.007    0.007  -0.007 
  (1.01) (3.52) (0.51) (3.32) (0.010)    (0.008) (0.013) 
Mitchell  -0.472 -2.442 -0.371 -3.080 -0.002    -0.001  0.009 
  (0.63) (2.20) (0.32) (2.07) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Bichette  0.437 2.207 0.433 1.033  0.022***  -0.005  -0.013 
  (0.73) (2.55) (0.37) (2.40) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Johnson  1.562** -0.432  -0.255  2.943 0.008    -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.66) (2.30) (0.34) (2.17) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.009) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Each coefficient came from a separate regression which is 
specified similarly to the ones in Table 3 but use the indicated player instead of Jose Canseco as the independent 
variable.  The displayed coefficient from each regression is for the variable "after playing with" the indicated player.  
The 27 players listed are the ones described in Table 8.  